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1.1  Introduction 
The American automobile industry employed a fantastic diversity of com- 
pensation systems to pay its blue-collar employees during the interwar period. 
Some employees were paid according to a linear piece rate-that  is, they re- 
ceived a fixed fee per unit of output. Others were paid according to more com- 
plex piecewise linear systems in which the piece rate was constant at a rela- 
tively low value over an initial range of output and then increased sharply for 
one or even several higher ranges of output. There were also systems in which 
the piece rate rose continuously with output. There were nonlinear piece-rate 
systems in which the piece rate increased  continuously  with output but at a 
decreasing rate. There were nonlinear systems that were concave upward rather 
than downward, that is, in which the payment per piece increased at an increas- 
ing rate as output grew.’ There were even more varieties of group incentive 
schemes. These involved the same set of formal relations between output and 
compensation, but the output in question was that of a group of workers. The 
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sizes of these groups varied widely. And there was more heterogeneity still. At 
Ford, employees were-and  had been for years-paid  by the hour. 
The infancy of the American automobile industry may be said to have ended 
in the winter of  1913-14  when the idea of  mass production and the implica- 
tions of Ford’s $5 day burst upon the public consciousness. At the time, many 
journalists noted, Ford was the only firm in the industry paying its employees 
exclusively by  time rates. Individual  piece rates were by  far the commonest 
means of remuneration. About a decade later, a study conducted by  the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (1926) reported on compen- 
sation practices in ninety-nine establishments (whose employment was said to 
represent about one-third of the industry as observed in the census of manufac- 
turers conducted  two years previously).  It showed nearly  40 percent  of  the 
establishments with some sort of bonus scheme in place.  In some of  these 
establishments, the bonus was based on individual performance.  In some, it 
was based on the performance of groups. Which type of scheme predominated 
is not clear, but there had definitely been some movement to the group basis. 
A 1934 article on compensation systems by the Detroit editor of Automotive 
Industries makes it clear that by the early thirties group schemes had become 
dominant and even ubiquitous. The point of the article is that the whole of the 
assembly industry seemed to be in the midst of a shift to time rates.* The diver- 
sity of  the midtwenties is thus striking, but it also appears as one stage in a 
longer sequence. By the  1920s, payment systems had evolved from very indi- 
vidualistic  schemes  to  ones  oriented  predominantly  toward  medium-sized 
groups. In  the next decade, the focus would continue to evolve toward very 
large groups, even entire factories. 
How are we to understand these patterns? It is widely believed that the in- 
dustry  switched briskly  over to mass-production  methods  when  the  $5 day 
brought reporters and photographers into the Ford factories. I argue below that 
this is false. Ford’s production techniques actually diffused quite slowly. In the 
mid- and even late twenties, production technology remained heterogeneous. 
This is the key to understanding the contemporary diversity of compensation 
systems. 
Compensation schemes can function as important mechanisms of control in 
factories in  which production  is carried out by  many  independent  decision 
makers (that is, workers). Compensation systems offer workers incentives that 
help shape their decisions about how hard to work and how to allocate their 
effort and attention. Which compensation  system is best for a given factory 
depends on how the work tasks of these decision makers are related to prod- 
uct  performance  and to one another,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  nature 
of the production technology. With some technologies, these tasks might be 
2. Denham 1934. The author remarks, in passing, that “group bonus methods of  worker com- 
pensation have never been as general in parts plants as in car factories” (703).  I will come back to 
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relatively independent. With others, they might be coupled together extremely 
tightly. 
This  general  perspective  suggests  that  compensation  systems  ought  to 
evolve with the production technology (or, more precisely, with the production 
system) deployed. Similarly, the diversity of such schemes ought to be a func- 
tion of the diversity of production  systems. The midtwenties’ heterogeneity 
of compensation systems was driven by  heterogeneity in the organization of 
production. The convergence of predominant types of compensation systems 
over time basically reflected a convergence of  approaches to organizing pro- 
duction in the population of automobile plants. There was relatively great vari- 
ety in the production  systems in place in  the midtwenties.  Ford-style  mass 
production did not triumph until later. 
This paper begins with a sketch of the technological history  of  the auto- 
mobile industry and an analysis of  the implications of this history for work- 
force control and compensation. I then show that Ford’s ideas really did diffuse 
at a slow pace and that there was considerable variety in the production  sys- 
tems employed by automobile firms in the 1920s. Finally, I use anecdotal evi- 
dence and some formal tests to explore the relationship between the production 
system and the method of compensation employed. The test results  confirm 
the main hypothesis, but there is some unexplained variation as well. The paper 
closes with a discussion of the significance of such unexplained variance in the 
history of economic institutions. 
1.2  Mass Production and Compensation 
In the early years of the industry, all cars were assembled on sawhorses in 
the center of  a low-ceilinged room. Workers fetched parts from bins around 
the edges of this area. They kept their tools on or near workbenches running 
around the perimeter. Most of the work involving tools took place on the work- 
benches. The parts themselves were often irregular, requiring careful filing and 
fitting. Most of this filing and fitting went on away from the sawhorses. Anyone 
who wanted to observe the fit, worker or manager, had to be physically very 
close to the piece to do so. 
Lighting in these work  spaces was often poor. Sightlines were frequently 
physically obscured. Because it was difficult to monitor the pace of work, ma- 
terial inputs spent a lot of time sitting around under this system; and labor 
certainly spent a lot of time walking  around. The extent to which the latter 
was appropriate or simply a means of working less hard was quite difficult for 
managers to judge. 
The best compensation  system in such a setting is a piece rate. The early 
production  process was  a highly  decoupled  system. Roughly  speaking, ex- 
tremely small groups of  people assembled each car from start to finish. For 
any particular assembler,  then, there were very few other assemblers whose 
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individuals  were close substitutes for one another. From the perspective  of 
the owners of the company, more output was therefore unambiguously better, 
whoever it came from. Furthermore, the owners did not have much money tied 
up in physical capital in these factories. Most of their machinery was relatively 
inexpensive and general-purpose. The artisans owned many of their tools. The 
owners’ main stake in the pace of production came from their ownership of 
materials and work in progress. 
Ford perfected  two improvements to this way  of proceeding.  The first of 
these, progressive assembly, made managing the chaos of the early shop floor 
much easier. Under this system, the men stayed put, and the parts and work 
flowed wherever they were needed. Monitoring and logistical control became 
much easier, and productivity increases were quite substantial. The Studebaker 
Corporation reorganized  the layout of its automobile production  facilities in 
1913 to install progressive assembly. We can derive from its experience a rough 
rule of thumb of what shop-floor reorganization without any major capital in- 
vestment might yield a competitive firm  circa 1913, holding constant the de- 
gree of design complexity.’ In this, the one example that has been documented, 
man-hours per car fell by about 47 percent. 
This innovation coupled the work of assemblers far more tightly together. 
More precisely, it coupled tightly the work of all assemblers whose stations 
were not separated by buffer stocks. Within these groups, coordination of pace 
became much more valuable. This in turn increased the value of  incentive sys- 
tems that encouraged the workers to coordinate  with one another. All other 
things equal, the optimal size of the group whose output should be measured 
would have grown. 
Note, however, that this innovation by  itself simply changed the layout of 
work. Job content remained, at least in principle, untouched.  Controlling the 
expense of materials stocks had been rendered easier. But control over the flow 
of work  itself remained  elusive because  the jobs remained  highly  artisanal. 
What more did the managers know, after all-and  what more could they then 
control-about  the work remaining? In the absence of other changes, the tasks 
themselves remained suitable only for highly skilled machinists working with 
a great deal of autonomy and exercising very great control over their time. 
Ford’s second essential innovation, which at Ford (but not at Studebaker and 
other firms) was apparently more or less simultaneous with the first, changed 
all this as well. Ford brought American-system  production of  parts-that  is, 
production of parts standardized to such high tolerances that they were for all 
practical purposes  interchangeable-into  automobile  manufacturing,  and he 
did this on a more or less comprehensive  basis.  Suppliers were reluctant to 
dedicate their own capital equipment to making parts for a single customer 
3. I  have argued at length in Raff  1992 that the company did not begin to deploy American- 
system parts production on any substantial scale until the war years at the earliest. The shift to 
progressive assembly is the only important change in the production process going on during the 
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(see Helper  1991). The risks of holdup were too great.4 If Ford wanted the 
investment, he had to  do the bulk of  it himself. The resources thus required 
from Ford for physical and organization capital were huge. But a direct conse- 
quence of  committing them was that assembly, and most production jobs as 
well,  could be  completely routinized. The main  effect was to allow central 
coordination and control of the work pace: the need for judgment, and with it 
the artisan’s discretion, was banished from his shop floor for eve^.^ 
The deployment of the American system put much more shareholders’ capi- 
tal into the factories. Progressive assembly made the production system much 
more highly interconnected. Together these two changes increased the impor- 
tance-to  the owners of the capital-of  actually keeping the equipment fully 
utilized and the output flowing smoothly. Workers executing their tasks in an 
uncoordinated fashion became potentially quite expensive, raising questions 
of control and compensation in an extremely salient form (Raff 1988). Ford’s 
procedure was to pay time rates. Why precisely was this strategy wise? 
The discussions of compensation systems one finds in the economics litera- 
ture are not particularly helpful in resolving this question. The analyses come 
in two basic varieties. The first focuses on risk sharing between the firm and 
its employee; the other is directed toward the problem of getting differentially 
productive employees to identify themselves. The models in both theories are 
set up to focus attention on problems in the labor market and on decentralized 
incentives-the  price system-as  a solution. Firms need to undo as best they 
can a fundamental informational imperfection so as to get each worker to work 
as hard as he or she efficiently can and to enroll the most productive group of 
workers in the enterprise to begin  with. In both  cases, the basic underlying 
assumption is that the firm desires as much output as it can get from each and 
every worker. Both models put essentially all their emphasis on labor supply. In 
the name of analytic tractability, they ignore the imperatives of the production 
technology itself. Yet anyone who can visualize Charlie Chaplin on the assem- 
bly line will recognize that models such as these cannot help us understand 
what was going on at Ford. 
The point of this intuition is that the assembly line is a setting in which all 
inputs  and  activities  need  to be precisely  coordinated.  In  mass  production 
of the assembly-line variety, uncoordinated increases in output are generally 
simply  wasteful:  they  do nothing  but  increase  work-in-process  inventories 
and so tie up working capital. If the rate of  production is high, this can be 
very expensive. 
Theory appropriate to this setting would instead be written in the spirit of 
Martin Weitzman’s famous paper “Prices versus  Quantities”  (1974). Weitz- 
man’s article is about the choice between decentralized (price-guided) systems 
4. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978. For the testimony of one supplier, see Sloan 1941. 
5. It was this routinization and central control that allowed the efficient use of  the expensive 
capital stock, the large-scale economies, and so forth. See Raff  1995, chap. 3. 18  Daniel M. G. Raff 
of national resource allocation and central planning. The “peripheral units” of 
his article are factories. In the present setting, they would be the suppliers of 
effort and, through  that, intermediate inputs into the automobile production 
process. Weitzman’s central concern is the balance of costs and benefits in the 
peripheral units induced by  two alternative  schemes of telling them how to 
decide what to do. The first is the decision rule “expand production until mar- 
ginal cost rises to some specified price,” where in our case marginal cost is the 
marginal disutility of effort to the worker. The specified price is the piece rate 
he receives.  Under the second decision rule, managers simply tell the effort 
suppliers what to do, paying them compensation based on obedience rather 
than on output per se. If workers keep the centrally determined pace, they are 
paid for their time. If not, they are fired. 
The objective in Weitzman’s model is to maximize the total net benefit, that 
is, profits. Weitzman shows that which control mode is best depends crucially 
upon the degree to which costs and benefits shift when output is not at just the 
desired level. When the level of marginal benefit is less sensitive to changes in 
quantities than is the level of marginal cost, it pays to focus attention on getting 
the cost side exactly right. The price-guided system is best for that. When the 
level of marginal benefit is more sensitive to changes in quantities than is the 
level of marginal cost, it pays to focus on the benefit side. A quantity-guided 
system is better for that. How was automobile production changing? The two 
most obvious examples may  suffice to make the point.  As production runs 
grew longer and new setups became less frequent, costs grew less sensitive. 
As the production process grew more tightly  coupled  and more employees 
and work in process had to stand idle whenever particular parts were, however 
temporarily, unavailable,  benefits become more sensitive. In the progressive 
introduction of mass-production methods to the various production and sub- 
assembly  processes  and  ultimately  to  final  assembly  itself  at  Ford,  costs 
were  becoming  less  sensitive  and  benefits  were  becoming  more  sensitive. 
The system was shifting in a direction favoring quantity controls.6 
1.3  The Diffusion of Mass Production 
Neither of the two central principles of  the organization of mass production 
were original or distinctive to Ford. Progressive assembly was tried relatively 
early on at Studebaker, and the earliest attempts at truly interchangeable parts 
production in the automobile industry came well before the Model T.’  But Ford 
6.  I should note that Weitzman (1974) speculates about this sort of situation without modeling 
it formally. But that task has been carried out in an unpublished Ph.D. thesis by one of his students, 
Gary Yohe. Technically, the question is what happens to the “coefficient of advantage” of, say, the 
price-setting mode over the quantity-setting mode when there are multiple producers of comple- 
mentary goods and the degree of complementarity is rising. The answer comes down to a shift 
toward quantity setting. Montias 1976, 226, summarizes the argument. 
7. On progressive assembly at Studebaker, see Raff 1992. The best example of interchangeable 
parts manufacturing is Ransom Olds’ Curved Dash Oldsmobile of  1904. Raff  1992 discusses this 
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did innovate. Ford combined the two principles and deployed them relentlessly 
throughout the production system. Moreover, he used them to control centrally 
the pace of work so as to keep all fixed and quasi-fixed assets working at ca- 
pacity. 
How  swiftly  did  the  Ford  system  diffuse?  The economist’s  intuition- 
prompted by all the attention the Highland Park plant received and by the atten- 
tion paid to Henry’s millions too-is  probably “quickly.” But an examination 
of the equipment in place in automobile plants during this period shows this 
intuition to be false.8 
The most familiar outward sign of  the system was conveyors. Moving as- 
sembly lines certainly were in place in a number of other firms by mid-1916. 
Articles in the trade press suggest that these were responsible for Ford-style 
quantity production, but there is good reason to doubt these  claim^.^ Conveyors 
indicated only that the firm was using progressive assembly techniques, and 
we have seen that these could be deployed (and yield substantial savings) in 
the absence of American-system production. But the essence of the American 
system was the intensive use of purpose-built machine tools or general-purpose 
machine tools dedicated through the use of devices known as  jigs and fixtures. 
Ford implemented the system through large-scale investment in precisely these 
sorts of machines and tools. Records from the Studebaker company, one of the 
handful of firms at which one might expect to find Ford methods if one could 
find them anywhere, indicate that Studebaker was certainly not investing in 
single-purpose machine tools on any serious scale. lo  Surviving records listing 
all major machine-tool purchases during the period 1913-16  indicate that the 
company  was buying  general-purpose  tools.”  For  Studebaker to engage in 
American-system production, it would have to dedicate these tools using jigs 
8. Confirming any sort of  answer statistically is a difficult sort of exercise. There are no census 
statistics that could serve as even relatively unequivocal proxies. Company balance sheets of the 
day, when issued at all, are occasionally helpful (see below), but much more often they offer no 
useful information whatsoever. A single line item for “real estate, plant, and equipment” sheds 
little light on the particular patterns of capital investment suggested by a changeover to American- 
system production. The investigator is driven to articles about new developments in the trade jour- 
nals and to surviving company archives for photographs, records of purchases of physical capital, 
and traces of discussions among knowledgeable managers. 
9. For an example of the claims with some photographs and shop-floor diagrams, see “Conveyor 
System Aids Big Production,” Auromobile, 20 July 1916, 100-104. 
10. One might expect to find Ford methods there because the Studebaker automobile operation 
had been run for some years by Walter Flanders, the engineering manager who came to automobile 
manufacturing from the Connecticut Valley gun trade (the seedbed of the American system) and 
who had brought progressive assembly to Ford. See Raff 1991a. 
11. There are, of course, some exceptions. Page 5 of the Srudebuker News for January  1915 
gives a splendid photograph of one of them. But the records of the Finance Committee (which 
considered all capital investment proposals, down to $200 common machine tools) suggest that 
the company was investing only reluctantly in machinery. The minutes of the meeting of 2 Septem- 
ber  1915 record that “[mluch  delay in production has occurred  from old machinery breaking 
down. . . . The Production Department feel the importance of purchasing additional machinery to 
take the place of that which is antiquated, and also of adding to the present machinery new equip- 
ment as much as will be necessary from time to time to equip some of the proposed new buildings.” 
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and  fixtures.  The  telltale  sign  would  therefore  be  substantial  investment 
in these kinds of devices. but there is no evidence of  such purchases  in the 
records,  Moreover,  balance sheets for both  Ford  and  Studebaker covering 
the year  1915 are sufficiently detailed to enable us to calculate the unit output 
per dollar of investment in such tools. The more Americanized the production, 
the higher this ratio should be. Ford used these tools roughly two-and-a-half 
times as intensively as Studebaker. 
This is not to suggest that Studebaker failed to devote a good deal of time 
and  energy  to  efficiency-enhancing  improvements.  Board  and  committee 
minutes for 1914 and 1915 are replete with references to shop-floor reorgani- 
zations (implementing, for example, progressive assembly and otherwise min- 
imizing the excuses employees had to wander around the plant), attempts to 
plan plant workloads farther in advance, and the introduction of conveyor belts. 
But the general tenor is well summarized by the discussion concerning con- 
veyor belts. The Finance Committee considered  and  approved putting  in a 
number  of  them, including  one for chassis.  The advantages  cited  included 
eliminating five hundred men from the payroll (this was about one-seventh of 
their average monthly workforce in the Detroit operation that year) and low- 
ering works and inventory expense as well as certain vaguely stated gains in 
flexibility. One official remarked that “[tlhis runway and these conveyors will 
more than pay for themselves in the first year’s labor savings.”I2  The gains were 
admittedly substantial, but the point to emphasize is that this was labor saving, 
not labor control. It was certainly not mass production a la Ford. 
Two vignettes fill in this portrait of pre-American  system operations. The 
first concerns the reaction  of  Studebaker’s directors  to the  $5 day.  Finance 
Committee minutes describe this in considerable  detail. All the members of 
the committee were close to their enterprise. Yet they could not fathom what 
Ford was up to. Minutes of the meeting of  19 January  1914, for example, in- 
clude both false scents-“Ford  . , . undoubtedly will have the pick of men”- 
and nervous reassurance-“It  is believed in the city that his plan contravenes 
all economic laws and must in the end fail because of competition.” Committee 
memhers were sure that the new measures  would  hring financial  diwster to 
Ford’s company. It is plain they had no idea where any increased productivity 
that might pay for them-and  more-could  come from.’? 
Indeed, when they decided later that winter that a considerable short-term 
increase in their own productivity was called for, centralized control was the 
farthest thing from their minds. The means they seized upon to increase output 
was to change their workers’ compensation scheme to an extremely individual- 
ized incentive scheme: “In order to counteract the possibility of  [labor] trouble 
12. See the finance committee minutes for 19 January  1914. For shop-floor reorganization, see 
13. Raff  1995, chap. 6,  reconstructs the calculations Ford management seems to have done for 
the minutes for 2 September. For advance planning, see 23 March. 
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in our factory, and at the same time increase the production of the intervening 
months so that we will be best prepared for trouble if it comes, [our managers] 
feel it would be desirable to change our wage method to a piece rate system so 
that our men can make more money and at the same time turn out more prod- 
uct.”  l4  The vice president in charge of construction and engineering reported 
to the board of directors the following August that the company had “always 
believed an incentive wage system to be a very important factor in promoting 
efficiency.”I5 The context makes plain that he was using the phrase “promoting 
efficiency” here to mean maximizing each individual’s output. He went on to 
say that, having received the approval of the Finance Committee, he and his 
colleagues had instituted a piecework  system in the production departments 
earlier in the fiscal year. He then devoted most of a page to statistics demonstra- 
ting how helpful this has been: one department’s output had grown 66 percent, 
another’s 141, another’s 223. “The resulting condition,” he concluded, “is one 
highly satisfactory to both employer and employee.” This was not a factory in 
which the central principle was coordination. 
David Hounshell suggests that the first large-scale implementation of Ford- 
style mass production came in the Chevrolet Division of the General Motors 
Corporation  circa  1923 (1984, chap. 7; on the economics  of this,  see Raff 
1991a). With the end of the war and the postwar depression, business prospects 
again looked expansive. GM had hired away Ford’s senior production manager, 
William Knudsen. His first post was on the corporate staff. As Alfred P.  Sloan’s 
overall competitive plans became  clear, however,  Knudsen was  given com- 
mand of Chevrolet and told to start competing seriously with Ford. 
Until this point, to  judge from the trade journals and the researches of Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr., there had been only two attempts at standardization at GM. 
When the Du Pont interests came in, they had attempted to integrate the ac- 
counting and control systems (Chandler and  Salsbury  1971, 17). There had 
also been a direct effort after the war to cut down on the variety of screws and 
nuts on order, an exercise primarily in inventory  Now, however, GM 
began to focus on assembly. 
Writing retrospectively in  1927, Knudsen detailed his steps (65-68).  The 
company purchased new machine tools. “Sequence lines” were established to 
pave the way for the conveyors that were to follow. Gauges and indicators (to 
measure tolerances) were devised for all operations of importance. A decision 
was made simply to abandon all scrap work rather than redo it. Only then could 
volumes seriously be increased.” 
14. Finance committee meeting of 9 February 1914. The labor trouble they feared was a return 
15. “Report of the Vice-president in Charge of Construction and Engineering,” Secretary of the 
16. Baird 1923, 334-37.  The two efforts were not unrelated, of course. 
17. Indeed, we  know  that the interdependence went even further than these actions suggest. 
Raff  1991a gives the details. GM introduced a new model called the Pontiac in 1926. It was for 
of the Wobblies, whose agitation had shut down their plants the previous spring for a period. 
Corporation files, Supporting Matter for Minutes, Directors Meeting of 4 August 1914. 22  Daniel M. G. Raff 
GM led the charge, but the rest of the industry ultimately followed. Perusal 
of the pages of the American Machinist for the decade of the twenties leaves a 
much more vivid impression of diffusion than does the analogous exercise a 
decade earlier. The installation of major conveyor operations is still news. But 
it is now nested among news of  extraordinarily dedicated machine tools and 
complaints from machine-tool builders  that the balance of demand ought to 
swing back in the other direction.l* Chrysler’s new Plymouth model in  1929 
was obviously aimed at the economies  as well as the markets pioneered by 
Ford and by Knudsen’s Che~rolet.’~  The manuscript returns to the 1929 manu- 
facturing census show the growing strength of  the mass producers:  the Big 
Three firms made two-thirds of the vehicles (Bresnahan and Raff  1991). On 
the other hand, the returns show signs of considerable and persistent heteroge- 
neity as well: the Big Three may have made most of the output, but they oper- 
ated only 26 percent of the establishments. The model product in  1929 was 
manufactured by mass-production methods, but the model factory did not use 
them. It took the Depression to kill off the artisanal enterprises and to establish 
the hegemony of mass production (Bresnahan and Raff 1993). 
What happened to skill, autonomy and judgment, and the general idiosyn- 
crasy of work tasks in automobile production as mass-production methods dif- 
fused? The number of firms manufacturing i la Ford had grown. Jobs in them 
were overwhelmingly routinized.20  So too were the products, superficial differ- 
ences and distinctions notwithstanding.  Yet  other enterprises operated, even 
opened, and flourished; and those establishments seem to have sold products 
that were  often genuinely differentiated and that  seem to have had  a much 
higher skill content. The production runs were all much, and sometimes very 
much, shorter. Many of these firms produced for a clientele that valued hand- 
work.2’ The rest had a clientele with needs sufficiently special that they had 
no choice.22  The artisanal producers thus had a market niche.  Elasticities of 
practical purposes some odds and ends of new body panels, an Oldsmobile engine, and otherwise 
entirely parts from the current Chevrolet. The basic purpose of this strategy was to sell Chevrolet 
parts to persons who would not buy Chevrolet cars and by  so doing enlist even these reluctant 
soldiers in the campaign to drive down Chevy unit  costs. This enabled all the main Chevrolet 
supply plants to support even more corporate revenue. 
18. On this latter point, see especially Heidey 192.5 (a paper presented to a production meeting 
of the Society of Automotive Engineers). On the (postwar) timing of the great burst of machine- 
tool investment, see Pletz 1926. 
19. The Pontiac strategy was also on Chrysler’s mind. The company had one central engineering 
and design staff, not one for each brand as at GM. The next attempt at large-scale entry, Studebak- 
er’s unsuccessful one, had a similar strategy of  common use of resources across product lines. 
20. Babson’s study focuses on the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of the remnant in the toolrooms. 
21. Some of this handwork was visible, as in the body and interior. Some was invisible but could 
be felt: careful balancing of rotating parts was taken to great extremes at Packard, for example, 
and even today old-car buffs say of Packard engines that nickels can be balanced on them. 
22. Thus, if the mass-production firms employed most of the people, then the typical employee 
in the industry could have a highly routinized job without the typical factory’s doing highly routin- 
ized work. 23  The Profusion of Compensation Systems in the Interwar Auto Industry 
substitution were low. At the margin, Ford and Chevy were not going to drive 
them out of business. 
But the business cycle could. The change the Great Depression wrought on 
this heterogeneous population of firms and product/production strategies was 
a striking one. The cycle winnowed out the relatively artisanal producers, leav- 
ing the mass-production firms and those tending in that direction intact (Bres- 
nahan  and Raff  1993). Economists might be tempted  to  speculate that the 
mass-production firms survived because they had the lowest long-run average 
costs. Competition would drive out the less “efficient” competitors. But Bres- 
nahan and Raff (1993) demonstrate that this was not in fact the selection mech- 
anism at work. Jobs were simple at mass-production plants; training costs per 
worker were low; and abrupt scaling back in the face of  slack demand was 
relatively easy. The artisanally organized cohort, in contrast, had major sunk 
costs in the indentification of personnel and the organization of production that 
it could not lightly reincur. It seems to have hung on to its workforce like grim 
death, ever hoping  demand  was about to return, until closure was the only 
alternative. Average practice  changed  through  change in the population  of 
firms as well as through changes in the practice of representative agents. 
1.4  Production Methods and the Puzzling Profusion 
We can now return to the subject of compensation systems and hope to test 
this technological explanation of  their incidence. There are two sets of facts 
that  require  explication.  The  first  is  the  heterogeneity  of  compensation 
schemes  employed  by  auto  manufacturers  during  the  midtwenties  cross- 
section. The second is the stylized time series, that is, the trend over time away 
from individual piece rates to group incentives to time rates. 
There is certainly suggestive anecdotal evidence in support of the theory. 
Speeches by factory managers and their technical support staff to the annual 
production meetings of the Society of Automotive Engineers show actual deci- 
sion makers addressing their colleagues on the subject of compensation sp- 
tems and articulating precisely the germ of the logic advanced here. In the 1923 
meetings, for example, the supervisor of time study at the Chandler Motor Car 
Company of Cleveland said straight out that manufacturing conditions, as well 
as the manufacturing processes in the departments of a large plant, vary consid- 
erably and cause entirely different problems to arise (Bouton 1923, 380-81). 
A single wage-incentive plan that would fit all departments in an automobile 
plant satisfactorily had yet, he asserted, to be evolved. Chandler had adopted 
the group piecework plan for the major assembly units and machining depart- 
ments and straight individual piecework for small parts that involved one, two, 
or at most three steps to complete. 
The following year an industrial engineer from Maxwell discussed imposing 
a particular group bonus scheme across many departments (Perkins 1924). He 
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ing failures as well. He attributed the difference to a series of factors, the first 
in the list of  which was (in the language of this paper) the organization of the 
production  processes  and the  interrelationships  between  the  work  tasks  in 
question. 
Are these merely isolated instances? The firms are, of course, unknown to- 
day. One would like to test statistically whether compensation schemes varied 
systematically across departments or at least across firms using broadly differ- 
ent production  techniques.  Unfortunately,  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics re- 
ports cited above cannot be used for this purpose: the reports’ authors guarded 
the identities of the plants and firms they described extremely carefully. With- 
out knowing which was which, there is no hope of associating compensation 
systems with production  strategies. This defect is worse in the widely cited 
studies of the National Industrial Conference Board, which provide even less 
detail about firms and their industrie~.~~  There is in fact no really satisfactory 
broadly based source of  data. But the trade journal literature is of  some use 
here. 
An article in Automotive Industries for 1925 gives a small cross-sectional 
sample of the sort required (Shidle 1925). Twenty-one firms were included- 
some relatively large, some small, some parts suppliers, some solely assembly 
firms, and only three  withholding  their names. The article details the wage 
system used most extensively by  each firm and lists other systems in place 
where applicable. Matching firms with systems reveals that relatively uninte- 
grated and relatively artisanally organized firms (i.e., those making specialist 
parts or entire cars substantially by hand) employed relatively individualized 
compensation schemes. Other firms used more group-oriented  schemes. The 
relationship  is not without exceptions and the sample is small, but the basic 
pattern does seem clear.24  The contingency table analysis summarized in table 
1.1 indicates, moreover, that the pattern is statistically signifi~ant.~~ 
This impression is strengthened by two glimpses of compensation practices 
within GM in 1927. At that time, GM used a variety of  production systems in 
its plants. The first glimpse emerges from a survey of methods of payments and 
wage-setting protocols conducted for the members of the Special Conference 
Committee by its secretary, E. S. Cowdrick.26  Cowdrick reported that hourly 
23. The best of these is National Industrial Conference Board 1930. For a typical citation, see 
Nelson 1991. 
24. This thrust is clearer once one understands that Packard, one of the exceptions, made efforts 
to routinize at least part of  its production processes beginning in  1922, its advertising notwith- 
standing. See Parker 1949. 
25. This is, strictly speaking, a test of the joint proposition that the claim is true and that the 
categories are the appropriate ones. The categories seem appropriate to me. But the test statistic 
should be interpreted cautiously. (Even if the test statistic were decisive, there still would remain 
the question of why the table shows any off-diagonal elements at all. This question of why there 
might be noise in the pattern is important and is discussed in section 1.5.) 
26.  For  more on this  extraordinary but shadowy  organization,  see  Gitelman  1990 and  the 
sources cited therein. A copy of “Methods of Wage Payments” can be seen at the Hagley Museum. 
Page citations are not given below, since the eccentric organization of  the manuscript deprives 
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Table 1.1  Cross-Section of Motor-Vehicle-Industry Plants, 1925 
Individualized 
Compensation  Group-Based 
Systems  Systems 
Relatively unintegrated production process  1 
Relatively integrated  4 
2 
11 
Note; The test statistic for this distribution is 45.64 >>  5% critical E 
rates, individual piece rates, group and pool piece rates, and group bonuses 
were  all  being  deployed  somewhere  in  the  company.  Those  responsible 
for choosing the  schemes were relatively  low level but themselves received 
performance-related pay, thus providing an incentive favoring the adoption of 
the  most  efficient  schemes. The trend, Cowdrick  wrote,  was toward  group 
bonu~es.~’ 
The rationale for group schemes was clearly stated by one of the interview- 
ees: they “lessen the need for supervision, since it is in the interest of every 
man in a group to have every other man working at his maximum efficiency” 
while enabling management to set the standards so that the well-managed fac- 
tory with satisfactory employees “can reach an average efficiency of from 108- 
110 percent [of a technical standard]. The actual average efficiency of the Gen- 
eral Motors Corporation is not far from this figure.” So the corporation was 
able to plan production relatively precisely  and get the employees to monitor 
straightforward  shirking as an extra. This was clearly an advantageous out- 
come in situations in which coordination was valuable. 
Only one fragment of  data on particular GM plants and systems survives, 
and it is strongly consistent with the analysis of this paper. Again, individual- 
ized compensation  systems are coupled with relatively  unintegrated produc- 
tion processes, and group-based compensation systems are coupled with rela- 
tively  integrated  processes.  Table  1.2  gives  the  numbers.  The  pattern  is 
statistically significant well beyond conventional confidence intervals. 
The time-series pattern then runs as follows. Production organization within 
surviving firms shows a progressive tendency toward integration. Compensa- 
tion practices show a progressive tendency away from individualized compen- 
sation schemes. The movement to straight time rates is a lurch, and it comes 
under the shadow of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the New Deal 
labor legislation-a  regime change as sure and deep as Ford’s once new idea, 
and in its implications quite similar.28  The legislation made it much easier to 
organize assembly and parts plants, thus giving small groups greater ability to 
27. It would be particularly interesting to know the history of compensation systems at Chevro- 
let. Research has not turned up  any time-series evidence concerning this during the period of 
transition in the Chevrolet production system. 
28. See “Johnson Warns Industry of Impending Wave  of  Strikes,” Automotive Indusrries, 10 
March  1934, 321, and, for example, “Drive to Unionize All Automotive Workers Seen in New 
Council Setup,” Aufomofive  Indusrries, 30 June 1934, 790. 26  Daniel M. G.  Raff 
Table 1.2  Cross-Section  of GM Plants, 1927 
~~  ~~  ~ 
Individualized 
Compensation  Group-Based 
Systems  Systems 
Relatively unintegrated production process  6  2 
Relatively integrated  0  20 
Note: The test statistic for this distribution is 1266.03 >> 5% critical E 
shut down the whole and so increasing management’s incentive to view the 
whole system in unitary  terms. While all this was going on, the Depression 
was, roughly speaking, wiping  out the plants with relatively  less routinized 
production systems (Bresnahan and Raff  1993). For both reasons, the attrac- 
tions of decentralized motivation systems were markedly on the wane. 
1.5  Patterns in Organizations and the Meaning of 
Unexplained Variance 
The main conclusions I draw from this story and evidence are as follows. 
First, there was a microeconomic logic to these historical decisions and events. 
As  the opportunity  costs of particular  ways of  organizing  production  grew, 
manufacturers adopted new techniques. Mass-production methods changed the 
opportunity costs of uncoordinated workforce activity. They changed the struc- 
ture of measurement and supervision costs. It should not be surprising to dis- 
cover that administration methods  in general, and compensation  systems in 
particular,  evolved and adapted to fit the circumstances in roughly  the ways 
these changes would favor.29  The data available to test this hypothesis are far 
sparser than is usual in empirical microeconomics late in the twentieth century. 
But they do support the story. 
Second, the tools required to do very microeconomic history  such as this 
need not be confined to models of black-box firms, perfect competition, com- 
plete and symmetric information, and continuous equilibrium, blown up from 
the textbook’s page to the scale of historic plants and firms. The sort of history 
this paper develops is not rooted in any mystical a priori belief in the perva- 
siveness of markets and competition. This microhistory is nothing but a study 
of the evolution  of  microlevel facts, seen in a particularly  orderly way. Effi- 
ciency-in  the usual sense of the survival of only facilities and methods that 
minimize long-run average costs-is  certainly not the only tale being told here. 
Artisanal firms continued to fill an important  market niche long after Ford 
introduced mass production. They disappeared  during the Great Depression 
29. For an interindustry cross-section of  data in  the mid-1920s covering more than 500,000 
employees, in which the incidence of  time and piece rates can  be  statistically explained in this 
spirit, see Malcolmson 1992 and Lytle 1942, 57. For a more recent econometric exercise in this 
general spirit (though with a quite different model), see Goldin 1986. 27  The Profusion of Compensation Systems in the Interwar Auto Industry 
not because they were inefficient but because the costs associated with holding 
together their skilled labor forces were too great to withstand the downturn in 
demand. Thus bottom-up labor history and marketing history as well probably 
have as much of a role to play as bare-bones neoclassical microeconomics in 
explaining why industries and production methods evolve as they do. 
My third conclusion concerns that which thus far has been passed over in 
silence: the unexplained  variance in regressions or in regressionlike tests and 
stories. Cross-sectional  tests never, as a practical matter, end up explaining 
everything. More concretely, the explanation I have sketched above leaves un- 
explained  why  innovations  in  methods  and administration  diffuse  slowly.3o 
Such a gap in the argument might undermine its appeal. So I should say some- 
thing about this in closing.31 
Economists  have traditionally  identified  firms with  production  possibilit- 
ies-that  is, with possible  Economists take the market for granted. 
This would strike any businessman as bizarrely abstracted. Businessmen orga- 
nize production. They takt finding “markets” to be a big part of their job. So 
they identify their enterprises not with outputs but with needs and with the 
resources and capabilities to meet them distinctively  well. Businessmen thus 
identify the firm not with what they could purchase, turnkey, in competitive 
factor markets, but rather with what is either unique or developed through (col- 
lective) experience within their firms. 
The relationship between these capabilities and the institutions and routines 
of  organizational life is a close one. Firms and their employees make huge 
investments in these. (Some are firmwide rules, some are individual- or job- 
specific. Generally speaking, they could not be replicated through a manual, 
since an important part of them concerns what individuals should do when the 
manual does not say or is not to be believed.) These investments are in effect 
sunk costs. Aside from situations of crisis or true watershed opportunity, it is 
often easiest for individuals to continue to operate in the way they are used to 
than to undergo the sunk costs of learning a new way. This induces conserva- 
tism even in the face of opportunities that might be quite attractive were there 
no other alternatives. 
Where the traditional economist’s vision  of organizational life makes one 
wonder why the take-up of  innovations  is slow, this vision  suggests, if any- 
thing, the opposite problem.  It has economic rationality  at its core, but the 
composition overall is well leavened  with culture, meanings, and the heavy 
30. This paper has even presented a clear example, namely the compensation systems at Stude- 
baker discussed in section 1.3 above. 
31.  See  Raff  1991b for a (somewhat) better-worked-out version of  these ideas. Nelson and 
Winter 1982 is in a similar spirit. 
32. In recent years, real progress has been made in developing a deeper analysis that might 
explain actual organizational institution within firms. The key development was the recognition of 
how commonly economic actors even within an enterprise will be less well informed than the 
traditional theory allowed. See Raff and Temin 1992 for a nontechnical introduction and Holms- 
trom and Tirole 1989 for a lucid guide to the technical literature. 28  Daniel M. G.  Raff 
hand of history. Firms are not the sort of entities brought turnkey in competitive 
markets. They are complex organizations that develop over time as people in 
them respond to perceived needs and opportunities.  That process often gives 
firms distinctive capabilities that can be a source of sustained abnormal profits. 
It also has a darker side. It can create resistance to change and adaptation as 
the firm may come to be, to its employees, a commitment to certain ways of 
doing things. 
This being so, it is entirely possible that the evolving incidence of within- 
the-firm institutions one observes owes less to radically innovative (“heroic”) 
managers than to the relatively mundane optimizing of  operations. given the 
slow evolution of firm-specific resource bases and competences and given the 
evolution of competitive conditions in product markets. Economics thus has a 
role in illuminating the history of business. History has an equally central role 
in useful economics. 
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Comment  Walter Licht 
Daniel Raff's paper appeals to my historian's instincts. There is a simple mes- 
sage here: life is complicated, appreciate the details; or, more specifically, busi- 
ness is complicated, appreciate the details. Raff shows that the introduction of 
mass-production techniques in the American automobile industry in the first 
decades of the twentieth century formed a slow and staggered process. The 
implementation of systems to assemble cars on moving conveyors with highly 
standardized components that were also fashioned on an assembly-line basis 
occurred only in fits and starts. Car factories into the late 1920s remained com- 
plex entities with a variety of manufacturing regimes, and as a result, a vast 
array of worker compensation schemes prevailed. 
Raff's  paper makes many contributions.  First, his essay accords with and 
supplements an expanding economic history literature that places great empha- 
sis on the unevenness of American industrial development. Fully integrated, 
bureaucratically  managed firms  represented  but  one path  toward  industrial 
growth. Small-to-medium-sized,  family-owned and -operated custom produc- 
ers persisted alongside the new behemoths and added greatly to employment 
and the prosperity of the nation. There was money to be made through special- 
ization, as well as through the achieving of economies of scale (and scope). 
Similarly, scholars recently have shown that the vaunted American system 
of  manufacturing  was more myth than reality. True standardization  in parts 
production-and  the elimination of skilled-work assembly-did  not occur in 
gun manufacturing in the I810s, in the sewing machine industry in the 187Os, 
or, as Raff argues, in automobiles in the 1910s. Some have suggested that the 
technological  wherewithal  for  precision-parts  making  had  not  yet  been 
achieved; others, that there was insufficient demand for standardized products 
in a still parochialized American marketplace and thus there existed little pres- 
sure for greater  technical  development. Whatever  slowed history, Raff  suc- 
ceeds, I believe, in bringing this story into the 1920s. 
He also succeeds in raising an issue that, as far as I can tell, has received 
practically no attention from scholars-and  that is the bizarre mix of formulas 
that existed to calculate the earnings of workers in American manufactories. 
Scholars have too glibly taken published  wage or income data and assumed 
that they are straightforward reflections of labor supply, demand, and marginal 
productivity.  Forays into company archives and perusal  of  payroll accounts 
reveal  complicated,  shifting,  confusing, and  unfortunately,  too often,  non- 
annotated calculations at work. Raff has made a contribution in bringing this 
to our attention, and I hope that his research stimulates investigation into the 
subject for other trades and time periods. 
Raff's paper does raise a number of questions. The first concerns the Ford 
Motor Company. Ford figures strongly in the opening pages of the paper and 
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then disappears from view, with attention turned toward Studebaker and Gen- 
eral Motors. Ford appears as an odd case here (actually, for business and labor 
historians, Ford for a variety of  reasons  has  always been  somewhat excep- 
tional). Early in the paper, Raff notes that in 19  13 the firm was the only one in 
the automobile industry compensating its workers through time rates (piece 
rates represented the norm). Later, he provides a quote that indicates that fif- 
teen years later the company still paid by  the hour and eschewed piece-rate 
systems (of any kind). This raises some questions for me. Because Ford still 
had a complex production  regime,  why did it not use varied compensation 
programs? Why was it exceptional? Ford remained heavily reliant on outside 
contractors for parts; purchased components represented more than 80 percent 
of the value of materials in Ford cars built in 1913 (Lewchuk 1989, 27). Does 
this or anything else help to explain the firm’s uniform  system of  compen- 
sation? 
A second issue relates to the main subject of the paper, that is, accounting 
for the varied compensation programs that existed in the automobile industry 
at least into the late 1920s (Raff does not deal with the entire interwar years as 
implied in the title). Raff rejects a number of  possible answers and opts for 
diversity in production, and here I find myself entirely in agreement but desir- 
ous of greater specification. First, though, some thoughts about rejected expla- 
nations. 
Raff rejects  the notion that different kinds of firm endowments could be 
responsible for variations in payment schemes; that makes sense to me because 
variations within firms are as important as variations between firms. Second, 
he rejects emulation. A small army of  industrial consultants were peddling 
their ideas at the time; although there was a great deal of dialogue and experi- 
mentation with labor arrangements because of this salesmanship-and  I would 
not totally deny an influence-too  many studies have convinced me that Fred- 
erick Winslow Taylor, his loyal and lapsed disciples, and his competitors rarely 
succeeded in getting their schemes accepted on a comprehensive or sustained 
basis. Practice was fashioned on the shop floor with and without fashionable 
ideas. 
Raff, too, rejects agency on the part of a highly politicized workforce, but I 
would leave that possibility open for further research. Studies of the Ford Mo- 
tor Company in England, for example, have found that piece rates were insti- 
tuted largely at the behest of organized and militant workers who hoped to 
gain a modicum of shop-floor autonomy (Lewchuk 1989, 28-29).  (This and 
the above statements on Taylor do raise a question about the implementation 
of payment schemes. Who were the chief architects? Top, middle, or lower- 
level managers? And were there inputs from below?) 
Finally, although not explicitly stated, Raff does reject the role of whim in 
the profusion of compensation arrangements. There is a rationale for him in the 
profusion. If the “imperatives of the production system” is the key, however, I 
believe greater details should have been provided. If this was a rational process, 32  Daniel M. G. Raff 
one might expect different compensation systems to have emerged from differ- 
ent sites in the overall production process. Were pattern makers, core makers, 
and molders in foundry areas, for example, paid by  time because of  the uncer- 
tainties in the casting process?  Were drill-press  and lathe operators, on the 
other hand, paid by the piece (with or without bonus incentives)? Were axle 
assemblers paid on a group piece rate and magneto assemblers on a group or 
individual-time basis? Were all final assemblers compensated by group piece 
or time rates?  A host  of  examples can be rendered.  If, in fact, diversity  of 
unroutinized tasks led to diversity in compensation programs, then the actual 
links should be drawn (of course, if documentation permits). 
Raff‘s paper raises for me another set of questions regarding events after the 
1920s. Raff actually isolates two developments: the move toward group-based 
systems of compensation and the shift toward  time-rate payments (although 
Ford remained consistent here). 
On the emergence of group-based compensation, Raff argues that the true 
implementation  of  mass-production  techniques  allowed for this, that  is, the 
institution of progressive assembly in all aspects of production (parts manufac- 
ture as well as sub- and final assembly) and the use of  highly  standardized 
components (made with single-purpose tools and machines). Greater routin- 
ization then leads away from individualized compensation schemes. I accept 
Raff‘s tables showing a relationship between integration and group-based com- 
pensation systems, but I am not convinced of the explanation. The new Gen- 
eral Motors’ plants of the late 1920s may have approached the ideal of mass 
production, for example, but they remained, and actually became more, com- 
plex entities. The diversified product lines pushed by Alfred Sloan led to fre- 
quent shifts in production,  and as a result the firm  moved away from single- 
purpose  tools  not  quite to full  all-purpose  ones, but  to what  were  termed 
“semispecial”  (Meyer 1989, 75-76,  82-83).  I do not necessarily see a more 
homogeneous  situation  appearing and would expect continued diversity  of 
compensation schemes. Are there other developments  at work  here leading 
to unified group-based systems of compensation? What of the role ultimately 
of unionization? 
As to the general move to time-rate methods of payment, the explanation 
rendered by Raff also seems cloudy. He mentions that New  Deal legislation 
and regulations played a part. But how important a role? Greater elaboration 
was necessary here. This aspect of the story might force qualification of Raff’s 
overall argument. 
I  would  like to conclude with a few comments on thoughts expressed by 
Raff at the end of his paper on the tense relationship that exists between econo- 
mists and historians. I am one of a small group of historians who have taken 
as their subject of inquiry the organization of work and labor markets in the 
past. We have tried to bridge gaps that prevail  between  labor, business, and 
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To date there has been a mixed dialogue between those scholars who share 
a common interest in what can broadly be labeled the labor process. There has 
been  no cross-fertilization between  labor historians and business historians, 
for example; for reasons I do not quite understand, business historians have 
shown little interest in the so-called personnel function. Dialogue between la- 
bor historians and  students of industrial relations has always existed-John 
Commons is a common discipline-founding father-and  there has been some 
and remains great potential for exchange between labor historians and labor 
economists. Labor historians can use all the help they can get with theory and 
methods to aid in the interpretation of their findings. And I am struck by the 
number of economic historians and labor economists who have moved toward 
historical labor study (Claudia Goldin, Gavin Wright, Richard Sutch, and Mi- 
chael Piore, to mention a few). 
I believe, though, that if a wider exchange is to occur, tolerance will be in 
order, and here I can circle back to Raff’s paper. He has focused on some messy 
details-the  stuff of history-and  specifically, the complex compensation sys- 
tems  that  existed  in  the  automobile  industry.  That  complexity  should give 
pause to easy theorizing about wages. Raff does theorize, though, about devel- 
opments, but developments that are not readily translated into supply and de- 
mand models or regression equations (I will note here the simple contingency 
tables that he provides). 
Good relations between scholars can occur if (labor) historians open them- 
selves to unfamiliar  language and  ways of  conceptualizing  and economists 
leave themselves open to be excited by the particulars (or the “heavy hand of 
history” as Raff calls it). While I have criticized Raff here for not providing 
ample specifics, I will conclude by applauding his great respect and apprecia- 
tion for the details. 
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